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The world economy is slowly moving into recovery,
but the EU is still struggling and hoping to avoid a
sovereign debt crisis, or to hinder that it develops into
a full second round of the financial crisis. Amidst a
grave uncertainty, important decisions, which will
have profound repercussions either for the good or the
bad, are still waiting to be taken or enacted. While
these decisions are related mainly to the sovereign
debt crises, to the pending reforms in the fields of
financial supervision and prudential regulation, and
to a new framework for fiscal policy and discipline in
the euro area, I think that it is also an appropriate
time to reappraise the framework and conduct of
monetary policy in this area. 
In this note I would like to examine two of the chal-
lenges facing the common monetary policy of the
euro area. These challenges emerge as we try to
respond to some broad questions posed by the crisis:
1. The ECB monetary policy strategy: has it performed
adequately during the crisis? Has the strategy been
adequately motivated and communicated?
2. The future enlargement of the euro area: should
new adoptions of the euro be expected or recom-
mended? Does the fulfillment of the convergence
criteria provide an appropriate metric for the
appropriateness and desirability of euro adhesion?
Are these criteria suitable when it comes to assess-
ing whether an appropriate degree of sustainable
convergence has been achieved? 
The ECB monetary policy strategy 
On several occasions the ECB has been keen to stress
that its monetary policy strategy “has been effective
both in turbulent times and during quieter periods”
(ECB 2011, 9). But is this really so? A central point of
an effective strategy is that “monetary policy must be
forward-looking and pre-emptive” (ECB 2011, 63).
The main characterization of being forward-looking
is a focus on the medium term: the ECB aims at
maintaining inflation rates below, but close to, 2 per-
cent over the medium term. This has two ancillary
implications:
￿ First, monetary policy decisions must be taken
with the understanding that “owing to the lags and
stochastic uncertainty in the transmission process,
changes in monetary policy today will only affect
the price level after a number of quarters or years”
(ECB 2011, 63). This in turn implies that current
policy decisions will be based on an assessment of
forecasts about future inflation rates.
￿ Second, the strategy leading to such decisions must
be communicated to the public in such a way as to
firmly anchor inflation expectations: “well-
anchored inflation expectations act as automatic
stabilizers in conditions of heightened macroeco-
nomic uncertainty and amplify the potency of mon-
etary policy in those conditions in which the trans-
mission mechanism is perturbed” (ECB 2011, 63). 
Both aspects of this strategy thus require the support
of reliable conditional medium-term inflation fore-
casts (that is, forecasts about where inflation will be
heading if the current policy stance is maintained or
if it is changed in either direction).
At the outset of the crisis, however, something has
been going wrong with these forecasting exercises. On
re-reading the press statements and communiqués of
central banks (the ECB, the FED, the Bank of
England) until the end of September 2008, well after
the collapse of Lehmann Brothers and the rescue of
AIG and all the rest, one gets the clear picture that to
most central bankers the upside risks to inflation and
the downside risks of lower growth were at best still
balanced. The growth outlook for 2009 was still pre-
sented as one of merely ‘slowing growth’. 
In early September 2008, the ECB was convinced that:
“to sum up, a cross-check of the outcome of the eco- * University of Bologna.nomic analysis with that of the monetary analysis
clearly confirms the assessment of upside risks to
price stability over the medium term. The information
that has become available since the last meeting of the
Governing Council has confirmed that annual infla-
tion rates are likely to remain well above the levels
consistent with price stability for a protracted period
of time. Against this background, it remains impera-
tive to avoid broad-based second-round effects in
wage and price-setting” (ECB Monthly Bulletin –
September 2008, Editorial, 7). With a different
emphasis, but equally out of tune with what was
about to happen, on 24 September 2008 the
Chairman of the Fed was still stating before the US
Congress Joint Economic Committee that real gross
domestic product is likely to expand at a pace appre-
ciably below its potential rate in the second half of the
same year and then to gradually pick up as financial
markets return to more-normal functioning and the
housing contraction runs its course. 
On 2 October 2008, the main stated preoccupation of
the ECB was still about the emergence of broad-based
second-round effects in price and wage-setting behav-
ior that could add significantly to inflationary pres-
sures. The Governing Council was especially keen to
stress “its concern about the existence of schemes in
which nominal wages are indexed to consumer prices.
Such schemes involve the risk of upward shocks in
inflation leading to a wage-price spiral, which would
be detrimental to employment and competitiveness in
the countries concerned. The Governing Council
therefore calls for these schemes to be abolished”(ECB
Monthly Bulletin – October 2008, Editorial, 5).1 No
other policy recommendation or action was then
deemed necessary. 
Then, on 8 October 2008, the ECB suddenly informed
the public that inflationary pressures have started to
moderate in a number of countries, partly reflecting a
marked decline in energy and other commodity prices.
Inflation expectations are diminishing and remain
anchored to price stability. The recent intensification
of the financial crisis has augmented the downside
risks to growth and thus has diminished further the
upside risks to price stability. Some easing of global
monetary conditions is therefore warranted. This
understanding paved the way for a historic decision,
jointly taken by several central banks, to announce
reductions in their policy interest rates.2 This was the
first in a dramatic series of interest rate cuts (together
with other, more unconventional measures). In the
euro area, during the seven months until May 2009,
rates on the Main Refinancing Operations were
slashed from 4.25 percent to 1 percent. Nevertheless,
in the revised editorial published on 9 October, the
most recurring significant phrase (5 times) was still
about the need to avoid ‘second-round effects in price
and wage-setting’. As this was stated on the eve of the
Great Recession, a naïve reader might have taken that
statement as an indication of some cognitive problem.
Someone more familiar with the ECB language would
instead suggest that it was only a symptom of the cen-
tral bank’s anxiety about its mission of anchoring
inflationary expectations.
Be that as it may, the sequence of decisions taken
from 8 October 2008 onwards was surely unavoidable.
The decision of the day, taken by the ECB together
with other central banks, testifies a radical change of
views (in particular concerning the inflation outlook)
which had been finalized over the course of two days,
between 6 and 8 October. This change should proba-
bly be interpreted as an honest, even if belated,
acknowledgment. And surely not many forecasters or
policy analysts are in the position of those who, being
without sin, may cast the first stone.
But the point remains that, in those circumstances,
the ECB was not anchoring, or leading, the markets’
expectations: it was struggling to follow them. This
was probably unavoidable, as neither recent memories
nor accepted analytical frameworks had been con-
ducive to expect events, such as those that were
unfolding during those days. But precisely for this rea-
son, errors of judgment should have been clearly
acknowledged, and capitalized upon. Instead, no real
explanation was ever given of that sudden turn
around. Reading the account of the sequence of ECB
policy decisions during 2008 (ECB 2009) gives the
impression as if something ineffable was going on, as
if the central bank was trying to keep anchored the
public’s inflation expectations, while being itself in a
sort of forecasting fog.
The point is not simply that I would have wanted the
ECB to play an intellectually fairer game. That sort of
fairness is perhaps of best use among academics, not
necessarily central bankers. The point is that to preserve
a reputation of credibility it is necessary to properly
account for past actions. The ECB is careful to state that
“the medium-term orientation implies that the policy
relevant horizon, defined as the horizon at which the
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2 The decision was shared with the Bank of Canada, the Bank of
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ECB pursues the sustainable alignment of consumer
price inflation with its price stability objective, can be of
variable length over time, taking into account the fact
that transmission lags are not only long but also vari-
able and uncertain. Furthermore, the inflationary or
deflationary impact associated with the accumulation
of financial imbalances may go beyond the standard
horizon of two to three years commonly used in infla-
tion projections” (ECB 2011, 69). But the questions are
still there: how could it be that a month before the
beginning of the largest deflation in the last 60 years, the
central bank was almost unilaterally focused on avoid-
ing the upside risks to inflation? And how did it happen
that the policy relevant horizon suddenly shrunk to only
a few months, as what were evaluated upside risks to
price stability in September 2008 turned into a realized
inflation rate of minus 0.6 percent in May 2009? Perhaps
some more naïve truth-telling could support the quest
for central bank credibility.
This is all the more necessary, I think, as we see that the
phraseology the ECB uses in its current commentaries
is still the same as before the crisis. For instance, in the
latest Bulletin to date we read that “in the Governing
Council’s assessment, the risks to this economic outlook
remain broadly balanced in an environment of elevated
uncertainty. […] It is of paramount importance that the
rise in HICP inflation does not translate into second-
round effects in price and wage-setting behaviour and
lead to broad-based inflationary pressures” (ECB
Monthly Bulletin – May 2011, Editorial, 5–6). Taken lit-
erally, and as we have been given only rather vague
explanations of what was wrong with the outlook fore-
seen in September 2008, the statement of May 2011
reflects a more deflationary assessment than that of
September 2008. Should we then get ready for a
renewed, or perhaps even a worse deflationary bout?
Probably or hopefully not, but then this implies that we
are no longer taking the ECB at face value for what it
says: credibility has been damaged.
The future enlargement of the euro area 
While the ECB has often expressed approval or dis-
approval in respect of different policies adopted by
the EU, on the issues of the criteria for euro mem-
bership it has been keeping, at least publicly, a low
profile. One reason is probably that it would be a dif-
ferent thing to express disagreement or criticism with
respect to the EU treaties, than it is with respect to
the policies proposed or adopted by the European
Commission or the European Parliament. Never  -
theless the issue remains that – beyond its anachro-
nistic formulation3 – the conceptual formulation of
the criterion for price stability is profoundly inade-
quate. The latest Convergence Report of the ECB
does pay some limited notice to “the further conver-
gence of income levels in most Member States cov-
ered in this report, which may put additional upward
pressure on prices or nominal exchange rates (or
both) [and to the fact that] many countries need to
shift resources from the non-tradable sector to the
tradable sector in order to achieve a more balanced
convergence, implying a stronger growth contribu-
tion from the export sector” (ECB Convergence
Report – May 2010, 31–32). However, the wider
implications of this acknowledgement are not dis-
cussed anywhere. In the following I would like to
sketch out some of these far reaching implications.
First, it is useful to be reminded of the importance of
the so-called ‘Penn effect’, which is portrayed in
Figure 1. The Penn effect is about a stylized fact: the
price level index (GDP deflator) tends to be higher in
richer countries, or – which amount to the same – the
real exchange rate (RER) is lower in poorer countries.
This fact may be rationalized in different ways (see
below), but also leads to another observable implica-
tion, named the dynamic Penn effect: in growing
economies, the RER will appreciate; that is, (more)
rapidly growing economies will experience (more)
steep increases in their price level index. 
3 Article 141(1) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European
Union (TFEU) and Article 1 of Protocol 13, both refer to ‘the three
best performing member states’ of the EU as providing the reference
benchmark for assessing price stability of other member states.
Clearly the Treaty admits that the benchmark countries could be
non-members of the euro area (this of course was inevitable until
1998): for instance, Estonia was acting as a benchmark for itself in
the convergence report of 2010; Denmark was part of the bench-
mark in 2008; and Poland and Sweden in 2007 – see also the discus-
sions in Buiter and Sibert (2006); Lewis and Staehr (2010).
Figure 1
Source: Ravallion (2010).
STATIC PENN EFFECT, 2005To put it in simpler terms, this fact states that real eco-
nomic convergence brings about a certain dose of
inflation. But if this is so, then countries undergoing
real convergence would be unable to keep their infla-
tion rate at par with that of other, richer countries.
Alternatively, if those catching-up countries wanted
to fulfill the Maastricht inflation criterion, in order to
achieve that goal their central banks would be forced
to impose high interest rates, in the attempt to curb
inflationary pressures which are, however, structural;4
but this would unduly penalize growth and thus the
speed of convergence. 
Do these arguments point against rich and poor
countries being part of the same monetary union?
Or more simply, would poor and growing countries
be unable to respect the Maastricht inflation crite-
ria, as long as the benchmark inflation rate is that of
the rich and slower growing countries? My conclu-
sions with respect to the Maastricht inflation crite-
rion will be that, even if we assume that the other
convergence criteria are satisfied, the inflation crite-
rion is neither necessary nor sufficient to assess
whether a ‘member state with a derogation’ has
come to ‘fulfill the necessary conditions for the
adoption of the euro’ (Article 139 of the TFEU),
which are meant to ascertain whether it has
achieved the ‘high degree of sustainable conver-
gence’ requested by Article 140(1). In addition, as
argued above, struggle to comply with the inflation
criterion may even unduly slow down the process of
real convergence. To understand these conclusions,
we first need to understand what lies behind the
Penn effect and its dynamic counterpart.
The relative poverty of a country, which is revealed by
a low GDP per capita, is a consequence, for given
rates of employment and labor force participation, of
low labor productivity. However, productivity may be
distributed differently across sectors. If it is low in the
tradable sector (T), which is exposed to international
competition, then wages in that sector will be low (to
make sure that prices of traded goods can stay close
to the law of one price). If those wages also prevail
(given the hypothesis of a homogenous labor market
within that country) in the sector producing non-trad-
ed goods (N), then (assuming productivity in this sec-
tor being not too much different across countries) the
prices of non-traded goods will be accordingly lower
in the poor country. Let us assume (only for simplici-
ty) that the nominal exchange rate is unity. Then what
we have said can be summarized as:
￿P TL = PTH , the price of traded goods (PT) is the
same in low (L) and high (H) income countries;
￿W TL < WTH, the corresponding wages are lower in
the low income country (due to lower productivi-
ty); and
￿W NL = WTL, wages in the low income country are
equal across sectors (and similarly in high income
countries).
Then, as a consequence:
￿P NL < PNH, prices of non-traded goods are lower in
low income countries.
From which it also follows that the GDP deflator (a
weighted average of prices) is lower in low income
country.
We may now ask what happens when a low income
country begins to converge towards the rich ones.
Assuming convergence to be defined as labor produc-
tivity approaching that in the rich country, our
hypotheses imply that:
￿P TL, the price of traded goods, remains unchanged;
￿W TL, the wage earned by workers in the low
income but growing country increase at the same
rate as labor productivity; and
￿ This is transmitted also to workers in the non-
traded sector, whose wages increase at the same
rate.
Consequently:
￿P NL, the price of non-traded goods in low
income countries, will grow at the same rate as
the growth of productivity in the traded sector
(or more precisely, at the difference between the
growth rates of productivity in the two sectors);
and
￿ The GDP deflator will grow at a rate equal to the
growth rate of PNL times the share of non traded
goods in the GDP basket.
Thus, if productivity growth in the traded goods sec-
tor is 6 percent per year, and non-traded goods (pro-
duced under constant productivity) are 2/3 of GDP,
then the GDP deflator will increase by 4 percent
annually. 
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So it is very unlikely that such a country will be able
to meet the Maastricht inflation criterion5 but the
point is that no harm will come to this country (nor to
its partners) if it fixes its exchange rate, or even if it
adopts the euro: as the differential inflation is entirely
coming from the sector producing non traded goods,
it will not be a signal of deteriorating competitiveness.
This argument implies:
￿ Proposition 1: if a monetary union is established
between two countries with different productivity lev-
els, and if convergence of price levels takes place as
a consequence of the convergence of productivity
levels in the traded goods sector, then: (a) the poor
country will have a higher inflation rate; (b) the dif-
ference in inflation rates will not affect the competi-
tiveness of the poor country.
It is then easy to show that, under the conditions of
Proposition 1, it follows that:
￿ Corollary 1.1: the Maastricht inflation criterion is
not necessary to ascertain whether an EU Member
State has achieved a ‘high degree of sustainable con-
vergence’ required for euro adoption.
In addition consider that, if a catching-up country
is able to fulfill the Maastricht criteria and is accept-
ed, if its initial price level is too low, then that coun-
try will experience most of the price convergence
after joining the monetary union. Therefore, on
average, its inflation rate will be higher than the rest
of the euro area. As a result, given the single mone-
tary policy of the euro area, the country will be
‘enjoying’ comparatively low real interest rates (mea-
sured in reference to domestic inflation). That, in
turn, may further inflate domestic demand, espe-
cially in those sectors, like construction, that are
highly sensitive to real interest rates, and also dete-
riorate the current account balance.6 We may thus
also state:
￿ Corollary 1.2: if a catching-up country, with low ini-
tial income and price levels, is however able to fulfill
for a sufficient time the Maastricht inflation criteri-
on and is accepted into the monetary union, it will
then be subject to abnormally low real interest rates,
which will have negative consequences on its domes-
tic financial flows and external balance.
Corollary 1.2 points to one reason why compliance
with the Maastricht inflation criterion (and the other
convergence criteria) should not be taken as sufficient,
in the case of a catching-up country, to warrant
admission in the monetary union.
The above arguments run well, I believe, under condi-
tions that ensure that nominal convergence takes
place as a consequence of real convergence.7 These
conditions (which I summarized previously) consti-
tute the well-known Balassa-Samuelson (B-S) model,
independently outlined by the two authors in 1964.8
However, the B-S model is empirically very fragile, as
it rests upon hypotheses, which may very well be fac-
tually unverified. Several things may go wrong with
the B-S hypotheses, but one is of particular interest
here. This is the case when nominal convergence pre-
cedes real convergence, which happens whenever, in
the low income country, the process of wage setting is
lead by those sectors that are not exposed to interna-
tional competition.
A priori I believe that the following factors might be
empirically relevant: (1) relatively larger output share of
the sector producing non-traded goods; (2) larger and
strongly unionized public sector; (3) more rigid labor
market; and (4) faster growth of labor productivity in
the non-traded goods sector vs. the traded goods sector.9
In addition, it may also be the case that prices and
wages converge as a consequence of being part of the
single market, or of the same exchange rate arrange-
ment or monetary union: in particular, if credibly fix-
ing the exchange rate fosters faster nominal than real
convergence (for example, by making international
prices more comparable) the process of catching up
may be accompanied by loss of competitiveness and
rising international imbalances.10
5 To keep the exposition simple, I disregard possible differences
between the GDP deflator and the HICP (which is the index consid-
ered in the convergence indicators).
6 The recent experience of peripheral euro area countries (Spain and
Ireland in particular) shows how a similar argument about inappro-
priately low domestic real interest rates may also apply to countries
that have completed the process of real convergence.
7 It can still be argued that, if inflation exhibits some hysteresis at the
country level, then an inflation criterion may be appropriate. This
may well be true although, as Buiter and Sibert (2006) observe, that
for a small country joining a large common currency area, prior
inflation convergence is helpful but not essential.
8 See Balassa (1964) and Samuelson (1964). A more recent statement
is made in Froot and Rogoff (1995).
9 Strictly speaking, although this last case may well lead to a deteri-
oration of competitiveness, it cannot be described as a prevailing of
nominal over real convergence.
10 Whether different exchange rate regimes might affect differently
the process of convergence, is an issue which has been disregarded by
the literature on the B-S effect so far. This is surprising because
exchange rate regimes have been shown to affect growth (see Levy-
Yeyati and Sturzenegger 2003), and, on the other hand, given the
emphasis that the Treaties (and the European Commission) place on
the temporary status of all ‘member states with a derogation’.In all these cases, whenever nominal convergence pro-
ceeds faster than the growth of productivity in the
traded goods sector, we will then observe that: (a) the
real exchange rate will appreciate and, more impor-
tantly, also competitiveness will deteriorate at the
same time; and (b) a current account deficit will
accordingly develop.
And possibly, to the extent that the initial increase in
wages was initially funded with deficit spending by the
government, we would also observe a version of the
‘twin deficits’ syndrome.
Moreover in such cases, when the tool of the
exchange rate to correct these imbalances is no
longer available (as in the case of an irrevocable
parity or of a monetary union), adjustment has to
come through a domestic deflation, which is likely
to be all the more painful absent the monetary
instrument.
Empirically, indirect evidence of the relevance of
explanations of nominal convergence alternative to
the B-S hypotheses is provided by the paucity of
results confirming the relevance of the B-S model. For
instance, Égert (2010) observes that the estimated size
of the Balassa-Samuelson effect is below 2 percentage
points per annum and is often close to zero, a result
which he comments as ‘puzzlingly low’. More direct
evidence is given by D’Adamo (2010), who finds that
for some transition countries (Czech Republic,
Latvia, Poland, Romania) wages in the non-traded
sector have been leading the process of wage determi-
nation. Also some causal empiricism suggests that
several rounds of public sector wage increases both in
Greece and in Hungary in the last decade took place
under similar conditions. 
Of the countries just mentioned, only Latvia is a
member of the ERM-II, and Greece of the euro area.
As the Greek case is well known, let us focus on
Latvia. Appropriately the latest Convergence Report
of the ECB notes in its respect that “rapid wage
growth in this period, which consistently exceeded
gains in labour productivity, led to an erosion of com-
petitiveness. However, as these macroeconomic devel-
opments proved unsustainable, the Latvian economy
experienced a deep crisis” (ECB Convergence Report
– May 2010, 44). 
In this respect, the ECB also noted that “to sum up,
although the 12-month average rate of HICP inflation
in Latvia is currently well below the reference value –
mainly as a result of temporary factors, including the
severe economic adjustment process – there are con-
siderable concerns regarding the sustainability of
inflation convergence in Latvia” (ECB Convergence
Report – May 2010, 45). This statement stresses the
fact that a point-in-time fulfillment of the inflation
criterion may well be compatible with a resurgence of
inflation in the long run: in fact (in strict correlation
with the excessive growth of wages) the HICP in
Latvia had been growing from 6.2 percent in 2004 to
15.3 percent in 2008.
But a stronger case can also be made that even con-
stant fulfillment of the inflation criterion is compati-
ble with a fast deterioration of competitiveness. For
instance, consider a case where wage and price infla-
tion are 3 percent across the whole economy, but there
is no productivity growth in the traded goods sector.
Then this would have satisfied the ECB inflation
benchmark as it had been set (according to the
Treaties) for the convergence assessments of both
2007 and 2008. But this would also have been com-
patible with a deterioration of competiveness of the
same magnitude, unless the country could compen-
sate it with an equivalent devaluation. Over the course
of, say 9 years, that could lead to a cumulative loss of
competitiveness in the order of 30 percent, which
would probably be unsustainable.
Hence we may wrap up our argument by stating:
￿ Proposition 2: if a monetary union is established
between two countries with different productivity lev-
els, and if nominal convergence proceeds in the
absence of real (productivity) convergence in the
traded goods sector, then competitiveness will deteri-
orate and a current account deficit will emerge, even
with moderate levels of domestic inflation.
￿ Corollary 2: as the convergence criteria is not con-
sidered under whether, after a catching-up country
has joined the monetary union, nominal convergence
will take place independently or as a consequence of
real convergence, compliance with those criteria is
not sufficient to ensure that a EU member state has
achieved a ‘high degree of sustainable convergence’
required for euro adoption.
Although these considerations will need to be further
supported by forthcoming research, they already
point to a clear normative conclusion: while the infla-
tion criterion is generally irrelevant, the other criteria
for convergence must be supplemented with different,
more stringent, ones, especially in reference to EU
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member states with lower per capita incomes (see
Table 1). In these cases, it is of the utmost importance
to ensure that a process of real convergence in the
traded goods sector dominates the domestic process
of nominal convergence, and will be continued after
the eventual euro adoption, until full real convergence
is achieved. Moreover, it is important that, after euro
adoption and because of the structural inflation that
is brought about by real convergence, domestic real
rates become too low and thus may fuel current
account imbalances. If appropriate additional criteria
cannot be formulated or adopted, then it will be bet-
ter to postpone euro introduction. 
As a last thought, it is worth noting that competi-
tiveness may gravely deteriorate even when a large
part of real convergence has been achieved: as the
story of Greece exemplifies, even a country with a
GDP per capita equal to 86 percent of the EU27 in
2001 (year of euro introduction) and 96 percent in
2009 can experience the unsustainability of the sin-
gle money, with negative repercussions both for itself
and for the fellow members. But this is clearly anoth-
er story, which however should only make us even
more cautious when examining future requests for
euro adoption.
Conclusion
I have argued two points. One is that the ECB has been
placing undue confidence in its ability to anchor infla-
tion expectations by simply iterating its commitment
to price stability. The public’s confidence in the resolve
of the ECB to maintain price stability will only be
heightened if the ECB will responsibly acknowledge
and capitalize upon its difficulties to analyze the out-
look for inflation at the outset of the Great Recession.
Similar remarks can be made for other issues in the
ECB portfolio: in several dimensions, one senses that
the central bank is not always fully acknowledging all
the risks to financial (and hence also monetary) stabil-
ity embodied in the present situation and in its own
policies. It must be realized that ultimately the confi-
dence in price stability and in the soundness of the cur-
rency will not be based on the quasi-religious repeti-
tion of propositions of faith on the central bank’s
commitment, but rather on a frank disclosure of cost
and benefits of alternative actions. The reputation and
credibility of a central bank will be better nourished
on the basis of such arguments.
The second point is related to the first one: it is time
to abandon the mantra that euro adoption is always
the best solution, once the Maastricht inflation crite-
ria are satisfied: these convergence criteria, which
some commentators thought to define ‘a mess – badly
drafted, at times inconsistent, and at times pure gob-
bledegook’ (Buiter and Sibert 2006) are in part irrele-
vant and in part misleading as regards the sustainabil-
ity of having adopted the euro, and can even be dam-
aging. It is time not only, but especially for the ECB to
speak more clearly about the inadequacy of the
Maastricht criteria. After all, the Treaty itself solicits
(for once) such open talk. Article 6 of Protocol 13 (on
the convergence criteria) precisely recites: 
Table 1  
GDP per capita in Purchasing Power Standards (PPS) (EU27 = 100) 
  2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 
EU27  100 100 100 100 100 100 
Euro  area  109 109 109 109 108 109 
Transition countries which have adopted the euro 
Estonia  57 62 66 69 68 64 
Slovenia  86 87 88 88 91 88 
Slovakia  57 60 63 68 72 73 
Transition countries which are member states with a derogation 
Bulgaria  35 37 38 40 44 44 
Czech  Rep.  75 76 77 80 80 82 
Latvia  46 49 52 56 56 52 
Lithuania  50 53 55 59 61 55 
Hungary  63 63 63 62 64 65 
Poland  51 51 52 54 56 61 
Romania  34 35 38 42 47 46 
Source: Eurostat. ‘“The Council shall, acting unanimously on a proposal
from the Commission and after consulting the
European Parliament, the ECB as the case may be, and
the Economic and Financial Committee, adopt appro-
priate provisions to lay down the details of the conver-
gence criteria referred to in Article 140(1) of the said
Treaty, which shall then replace this Protocol”.
It is now the time to follow up constructively on this
suggestion. 
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